As a reminder to all Members,

passage of this bill either by rollcall

vote or voice vote is to occur in

the 4 p.m. timeframe. We are trying to

accommodate Senators who have a

number of other meetings they need to

attend, but it will be either at 4 or 4:30

at the very latest. Members will be notified,

via hotline, as soon as the exact

time has been determined.

Mr. President, I rise in strong support

of this very important legislation,

H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation

Act of 1999.

Let me say at the beginning, this legislation

has always had strong bipartisan

support. It passed overwhelmingly

in the House of Representatives

last year by a vote of 419–0, and it has

always had strong support in the Senate

from Senators LIEBERMAN, FEINSTEIN,

and HELMS—a very broad, bipartisan

group.

I also have to acknowledge the cooperation

of Senator LEVIN, who has

been working with me on the managers’

amendment. I think it is important,

we now go forward with this legislation.

I am pleased I have been joined in

this effort by Senator LIEBERMAN, who

he is on the floor to participate in the

discussion of this legislation. Senator

LIEBERMAN is a long-time expert in

nonproliferation and Middle East matters,

and he certainly deserves a lot of

the credit for making this legislation

possible.

The purpose of the bill is to express

once again our deep concern regarding

the transfer to Iran of dangerous technology,

principally from Russia, China,

and North Korea, as well as from other

foreign entities, and to recommend additional

steps to halt this deadly trade.

Again, let me go into a little history.

This legislation passed the House and

the Senate in 1998. The President vetoed

it, but, at the request of the administration,

efforts were ongoing to

work with Russia. That veto was not

overridden. We did not vote on it. But

the hope that progress would be made

has not paid off; we have not achieved

the results we hoped for. You can say it

was because they had changes in the

leadership positions in Russia. They

are trying to make progress, but the

fact is, they are not making progress

and this dangerous transfer of the technology

that could lead to proliferation

of nuclear weapons continues.

This bill requires the President to report

to Congress when credible information

exists of a transfer of dangerous

technology to Iran. The President

must also inform Congress whether

he has imposed certain penalties on

foreign persons as a result of such

transfers. If such penalties are not imposed,

the President must report the

reasons why he decided against taking

this step.

The bill will also create new incentives

for the Russian aviation and

space agency to cooperate with the

United States in efforts to stem the

proliferation of weapons technology to

Iran by precluding certain payments to

that agency if entities under its jurisdiction

and control engage in such

transfers.

Think about that. The United States

is assisting the Russian aviation and

space agency at a time when entities

under its jurisdiction may, as a matter

of fact, be involved in transferring this

dangerous technology to Iran. It is absurd,

and the American people would

rightly be horrified to find that is the

case.

As I noted, this bill passed the House

last September by a unanimous vote,

and that vote occurred despite an explicit

veto threat by the President. The

overwhelming bipartisan vote in the

House and the strong bipartisan support

the bill enjoys in the Senate underscores

the seriousness with which

the Congress views Iran’s continued

quest for long-range missiles armed

with weapons of mass destruction.

I can think of few international developments

that would be as damaging

to U.S. national security and to stability

and security in the Middle East

as the acquisition by Iran of long range,

nuclear-tipped missiles.

We know already Iran has been the

most notorious state sponsor of terrorism,

including attacks on Americans,

and we know Iran remains a

steadfast opponent of peace between

Israel and her neighbors, and Iran supports

those whose violence is aimed at

undermining prospects for a genuine

lasting peace.

Some of our colleagues might observe

that they had elections in Iran

last week, and I believe those elections

continue now. It appears reformers

have been making some gains. That

may be the situation in Iran, and the

relations with Iran will change as a result

of that. Let me assure my colleagues

that the danger is still there.

Those who are in charge of this nuclear

proliferation in Iran have a very strong

grip on what is being done, and there is

very little likelihood they are going to

let go of it anytime soon, in spite of

what appears to be encouraging election

returns. In fact, one can argue

that to continue to send a strong signal

against Iran’s acquisition of weapons of

mass destruction actually bolsters the

reformers in their efforts to change the

approach of Iran, both internally and

externally.

While we are pleased to see what appears

to be encouraging results—and I

think the Senate should express itself

on that, and I will suggest to the

Democratic leadership we perhaps have

a resolution acknowledging what has

happened there and are hopeful about

what that may mean—I do not think

by any stretch of the imagination that

should lead us to think everything is

going to change immediately and we

should not go forward with this very

important legislation.

If my colleagues think about it, it is

quite scary: Iran’s leaders, now and in

the future, will be in possession of nuclear-

tipped ICBMs capable of reaching

Washington or Los Angeles or New

York. America’s security and that of

our friends and allies in the region will

be unalterably affected by such a horrific

development.

Yet that day of reckoning is coming

and much sooner than we prefer, unless

something is done to stop the transfer

of this technology and other forms of

assistance to Iran by Russia, in particular,

but also by China and North

Korea.

My colleagues will recall we have

been working on this for 3 or 4 years.

We have tried mightily to be of help to

the administration in trying to put

pressure on Russia in particular, but

that strategy has failed to slow the

flow of this dangerous technology.

Let me point out what CIA Director

George Tenet said recently in a report

to Congress on the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction over the

previous 6-month period. In that report,

Director Tenet wrote:

The report also stated:

The report also highlighted China’s

development in their programs. For example,

the report stated:

I had occasion to meet personally

with Director Tenet recently because I

wanted to hear what information he

had that he could provide to me and

other Senators who wished to have a

private briefing about what is going on

in this area, and also to discuss the recent

U.S. counterterrorism activities.

Director Tenet reaffirmed that the

flow of dangerous technology to Iran

from Russia and China is, in fact, continuing

and on a significant scale. It

has not dropped. If anything, it has become

worse. I urge those Senators who

have not had a chance to review this

classified record to go up to room S–407

to get this briefing. It is a sobering reminder

that despite the end of the cold

war, serious threats to U.S. security

and our critical allies around the world

remain.

I commend Director Tenet and the

entire U.S. intelligence community for

their heroic efforts to uncover the

truth about these dangerous transfers.

What makes the intelligence community’s

successes so much more astounding

is that they come in spite of significant

denial and deception by Russia,

China, and others.

Director Tenet’s report underscores

the administration’s current strategy

for dealing with this growing problem.

I know they worked at it. I discussed

this with National Security Adviser

Sandy Berger. They have tried. They

acknowledged it has been difficult.

They have had to deal with changing

people and the laws in Russia, of while

their intentions, as they provide them

to us verbally, appear to be in the right

direction, the results are just not

there.

The administration had hoped that

by engaging Russia, China, and North

Korea in a dialog, they could persuade

those nations to cease and desist from

their provocative behavior. The administration,

I understand, did get the

Russian Government to take some

steps, such as adoption of export control

law and regulations, but despite

this fact, not a single Russian has been

successfully prosecuted for transferring

weapons of mass destruction or missile

technology to Iran. Not one. I repeat,

the intelligence we get is it is probably

growing worse. So action against an individual,

action against companies or

academicians and professors, if there is

anything in that nature going on, we

do not see any results.

Thus, it appears the Russian Government

either supports this clandestine

transfer of dangerous technology to

Iran or is unwilling to take strong necessary

steps to halt it.

The same can be said for the People’s

Republic of China and the Democratic

People’s Republic of North Korea;

therefore, I join with many of my colleagues

on both sides of the aisle in believing

that it is time to send a strong

signal to the administration but, more

importantly, to Russia, China, and

North Korea, and to other countries

that may be contemplating the transfer

of this dangerous technology to

Iran, or to Iraq, for that matter.

The message is simple: The Congress

and the American people are not content

with the status quo. We are not

content with the dialog that produces

even more promises on the one hand

and scant or no real reduction in the

flow of technology on the other. Some

might say this bill is not strong

enough, and I would be hard pressed to

disagree with that. I would prefer it to

be even stronger. After all, the bill provides

the President with the authority

to impose sanctions, but it does not require

them. We may want to look at

doing that if we do not see some

changes. If we do not see some actions

by the administration, if we do not see

some actions being taken to impose

sanctions, then we may want to go that

next step.

I believe bolder action is going to be

needed, that this will not be enough. It

is a signal that is worth providing at

this time. Because of its strong bipartisan

support and because I believe it

will become law, I am willing to go forward

with it in this fashion at this

time.

The bill before us now reflects a continuing

commitment in both parties to

take a tough stand in the fight against

nuclear proliferation.

With this in mind, I urge the President

not to veto this bipartisan bill but

instead to sign it into law as soon as it

lands on his desk.

Again, I thank Senator LIEBERMAN,

Senator HELMS, and the many other

Senators who are involved in the process

of crafting this important legislation.

I strongly urge a ‘‘yes’’ vote on

H.R. 1883, the Iran Nonproliferation

Act of 2000.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.